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A WORKED EXAMPLE OF THE FUNCTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
HENRY TOWSNER
1. Introduction
Suppose we have a non-constructive proof: a proof that some quantity
exists but which does not actually tell us what the value is. Such a thing
might happen because the proof proceeds by contradiction, because it uses
the axiom of choice, or because the proof depends on an abstract technique
which takes us far afield from the quantity we original set out to proof the
existence of.
We might then ask whether there is any constructive proof of the statement—
a proof which actually calculates the quantities in the statement. The answer
may be no. Even if the answer is yes, it may require finding a completely
different proof, which could be as hard as—or harder than—proving the
theorem in the first place.
Our topic, however, is circumstances which guarantee that the answer
is “yes”: when knowing that there is a non-constructive proof guarantees
the existence of a constructive proof, and further, tells us how to find it.
Strikingly, at least to those unfamiliar with proof theory, both the circum-
stances and the method for finding a constructive proof are syntactic: they
depend on the written form of the theorem and its proof. While there exists
more than one such method, our focus in this paper will be the functional
interpretation (also called the “Dialectica” interpretation, after the journal
where it first appeared [18]).
If we hold a strongly formal view of mathematics, we can ask for proper
“meta-theorems”: we could take the view that a proof in mathematics is
always, at heart, a formal deduction in our favorite system of axioms—say,
ZFC. Then we could hope for a formal proof that, given any deduction of
a theorem with the necessary syntactic property, there exists a constructive
deduction of the same theorem. For many choices of axioms (not currently
including ZFC, but including systems which suffice to formalize most of
mathematical practice), such meta-theorems actually exist.
These theorems are of limited applicability by themselves, however. Even
if one believes that actual proofs, as written in textbooks and articles, are
intended as descriptions of formal deductions, obtaining those formal deduc-
tions is an arduous (and tedious) process. The usefulness of the functional
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interpretation comes from the fact that it can be applied, with a feasible
amount of effort, to actual proofs as written by and for humans. Of course,
we cannot have a theorem about “all proofs accepted by mathematicians”;
in the broader setting we have only a heuristic: the functional interpreta-
tion is a practical method for producing ordinary constructive proofs from
ordinary non-constructive ones as already written up in journals.1
As the title promises, our goal in this paper is to introduce this method by
focusing on a concrete example. In section 2 we’ll present a non-constructive
proof of a theorem on approximations of L1 functions. In section 3 we’ll
present a corresponding quantitative theorem with a constructive proof.
These two sections will be completely elementary—all that’s needed is some
very basic real analysis. (There is nothing new in our analysis of this theo-
rem, which derives from Kohlenbach and Oliva’s work [33]. We have chosen
this example because the underlying theorem and proof are simple enough
that they can be discussed in detail in a reasonable space.)
With a motivating example in place, in section 4 we will finally introduce
the functional interpretation, illustrating that the example in section 3 is
an instance of a general method. This section will necessarily involve some
actual formal logic—we’ll assume some familiarity with ordinary first-order
logic and the notion of computability, although we will keep the dependence
as minimal as possible.
We will conclude with some references to further applications in the liter-
ature.
The author is grateful to Jeremy Avigad and Ulrich Kohlenbach for helpful
suggestions on a draft of this paper.
2. A Theorem of Jackson’s
Throughout, we will only be concerned with real-valued functions on [0, 1],
which will refer to as just “functions”. When we write
∫
f dx without bounds,
we always mean the integral
∫ 1
0 f dx.
Definition 2.1. We say f is an L1-function if
∫
|f | dx exists. The L1-norm
is defined on such functions by
||f ||1 =
∫
|f | dx.
1Because proof theory is historically tied to intuitionist and formalist philosophical
views, its dependence on these philosophies is sometimes overstated. One need not believe
that formal deductions, constructive proofs, or syntax play any special role in mathematics
for proof theoretic methods to be useful. Even someone who believes that axiomatic proofs
are artificial constructs of no intrinsic importance should recognize that large swaths of
mathematics just happen to be formalizable, and therefore that methods derived from
their study just happen to be useful in practice. Our attitude can be the one attributed
to Niels Bohr regarding the lucky horseshoe above his door: “I am told it works even if
you don’t believe in it”.
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Many bizarre, complicated, or difficult-to-work-with functions are nonethe-
less L1, so it is natural to ask about approximating such functions by nicer
classes of functions; when the distance is measured using the L1-norm, this
is known as mean approximation. In particular:
Definition 2.2. Let f be an L1-function, and let P be a collection of L1-
functions. A best (mean) approximation to f in P is a function p ∈ P such
that for every q ∈ P,
||f − p||1 ≤ ||f − q||1.
We will mostly be interested in approximation by polynomials of low
degree.
Definition 2.3. We write Pn for the collection of polynomials of degree at
most n.
When P is finite dimensional, the existence of a best approximation fol-
lows immediately from a theorem of Riesz [43]. Our focus will be on the
question of whether the best approximation is unique. For an arbitrary set
P, it need not be:
Example 2.4. Let f be the function which is constantly equal to 2, and
let P consist of all piecewise continuous L1-functions p such that ||p||1 ≤ 1.
Clearly the function p which is constantly equal to 1 is a best approximation
to f in P, but the function
q(x) =
{
2 if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2
0 if 1/2 < x ≤ 1
is also a best approximation.
Uniqueness of approximations is related to a property known as strict
convexity of the norm (see, for instance, [12] for more general theory on
the subject of approximations); since the L1-norm is not strictly convex,
in general there is not a unique best mean approximation. However for
particular classes of functions, ad hoc arguments can still give uniqueness,
and an example of such a result is due to Jackson [21]:
Theorem 2.5. Let f be a continuous function. Then for any n, there is a
unique best approximation to f in Pn.
There are a number of proofs of this theorem [36, 42, 49], but we will ex-
amine a direct proof (in particular, avoiding the use of measure theory) due
to Cheney [11], which we break into several lemmas to make the subsequent
analysis easier. (Certain equations are labeled because we will want to refer
to them later.)
We need a few definitions.
Definition 2.6. If f is a continuous function, ||f ||∞ = supx∈[0,1] |f(x)|.
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(This is a simplification of the usual L∞ norm; we do not need the L∞
norm for discontinuous functions, and so can get away with this simplified
definition.) Note that, since f is assumed to be continuous, ||f ||∞ is defined
and finite.
Definition 2.7. If g is a function, we write sgn g for the sign function, given
by
sgn g(x) =


1 if g(x) > 0
0 if g(x) = 0
−1 if g(x) < 0
.
Lemma 2.8. Let g and h be continuous functions such that g has finitely
many zeros and
∫
h sgn g dx 6= 0. Then for some λ,
||g − λh||1 < ||g||1.
Proof. Let x1, . . . , xk be the zeros of g. We partition the interval [0, 1] into
two sets, A and B. B will consist of a small open interval around each xi:
B =
⋃
i≤k
(xi − ǫ, xi + ǫ) ∩ [0, 1]
while A = [0, 1] \B. We will have to choose ǫ small enough. Observe that
(1)
∫
B
|h(x)| dx ≤ ||h||∞ · k · 2ǫ,
so by choosing ǫ very small, we may arrange for
∫
B |h(x)| dx to be as small
as we need.
On the other hand, we know that |
∫
h sgn g dx| > 0, and we have
∣∣∣∣
∫
A
h sgn g dx
∣∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣
∫
h sgn g dx
∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣
∫
B
h sgn g dx
∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣
∫
h sgn g dx
∣∣∣∣−
∫
B
|h| dx.(2)
In particular, by choosing ǫ small enough that 2
∫
B |h(x)| dx < |
∫
h sgn g dx|,
we may arrange to have
(3)
∣∣∣∣
∫
A
h sgn g dx
∣∣∣∣ >
∫
B
|h(x)| dx.
|g| is continuous, and therefore the restriction of |g| to A has a minimum
somewhere on the closed set A, and since g has no zeros in A, this infimum
m = inf{|g(x)| | x ∈ A} must be positive. Choose λ so that 0 < |λ| · ||h||∞ <
m and sgnλ = sgn (
∫
A h sgn g dx). Then we have |λh(x)| < m ≤ |g(x)| and
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sgn g = sgn(g − λh) for every x ∈ A. Now we can compute:
||g − λh||1 =
∫
|g − λh| dx
=
∫
A
|g − λh| dx+
∫
B
|g − λh| dx
=
∫
A
(g − λh) sgn g dx+
∫
B
|g − λh| dx
=
∫
A
|g| dx− λ
∫
A
h sgn g dx+
∫
B
|g − λh| dx
=
∫
|g| dx −
∫
B
|g| dx − λ
∫
A
h sgn g dx+
∫
B
|g − λh| dx
≤
∫
|g| dx − λ
∫
A
h sgn g dx+
∫
B
|g|+ |λ| |h|dx −
∫
B
|g| dx
=
∫
|g| dx − |λ|
∣∣∣∣
∫
A
h sgn g dx
∣∣∣∣+ |λ|
∫
B
|h| dx
=
∫
|g| dx − |λ|(
∣∣∣∣
∫
A
h sgn g dx
∣∣∣∣−
∫
B
|h| dx)(4)
<
∫
|g| dx
= ||g||1.

Lemma 2.9. If f is continuous and p is a best approximation to f in Pn
then f − p has at least n+ 1 zeros.
Proof. Let g(x) = f(x) − p(x). Suppose the statement is false, so g has at
most n zeros. Since f , and therefore g, is continuous, there are at most n
points where g changes sign. For some m ≤ n, we may choose points
0 < r1 < r2 < · · · < rm < 1
so that the ri are exactly the interior points where g changes sign. Consider
the polynomial
h(x) =
m∏
i=1
(x− ri).
Since h(x) also changes sign exactly at the ri, it follows that h sgn g is either
always non-negative or always non-positive, and is not constantly 0, and
therefore
(5)
∫
h sgn g dx 6= 0.
By Lemma 2.8, there is a λ such that ||g−λh||1 < ||g||1, and equivalently,
||f − (p + λh)||1 = ||g − λh||1 < ||g||1.
But p+λh is a polynomial of degree at most n, contradicting the assumption
that p was a best approximation. 
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In order to derive (5), we used the following seemingly trivial fact, which
we will need again:
Lemma 2.10. Let q be a continuous function with
∫
|q(x)| dx = 0. Then
||q||∞ = 0.
Theorem 2.11. Let f be a continuous function. Then for any n, there is
a unique best approximation to f in Pn.
Proof. Suppose p1, p2 are both best approximations of f by polynomials of
degree at most n. Let p be the average, p(x) = 12 (p1(x) + p2(x)). Clearly p
is also a polynomial of degree at most n. Also
||f − p||1 =
∫
|f(x)− p(x)| dx
=
∫
|f(x)−
1
2
(p1(x) + p2(x))| dx
≤
∫
1
2
|f(x)− p1(x)|+
1
2
|f(x)− p2(x)| dx
=
1
2
||f − p1||1 +
1
2
||f − p2||1.
This means that p is also a best approximation of f .
Since p1 and p2 are both best approximations, we have ||f − p||1 = ||f −
p1||1 = ||f − p2||1, and therefore
0 =
1
2
||f − p1||1 +
1
2
||f − p2||1 − ||f − p||1
=
∫
1
2
|f(x)− p1(x)|+
1
2
|f(x)− p2(x)| − |f(x)− p(x)| dx.(6)
On the other hand, by the triangle inequality, for every x,
|f(x)− p(x)| = |f(x)−
1
2
(p1(x) + p2(x))|
= |
1
2
(f(x)− p1(x)) +
1
2
(f(x)− p2(x))|
≤
1
2
|f(x)− p1(x)|+
1
2
|f(x)− p2(x)|.
In particular,
(7)
1
2
|f(x)− p1(x)|+
1
2
|f(x)− p2(x)| − |f(x)− p(x)| ≥ 0
for every x.
Combining (6) with (7) using Lemma 2.10, for all x
1
2
|f(x)− p1(x)|+
1
2
|f(x)− p2(x)| − |f(x)− p(x)| = 0.
Therefore for every x,
|f(x)− p(x)| =
1
2
|f(x)− p1(x)|+
1
2
|f(x)− p2(x)|.
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Since p is a best approximation to f , by Lemma 2.9, f − p must have at
least n+ 1 zeros.
Suppose r is a zero of f − p. Then
0 = |f(r)− p(r)| =
1
2
|f(r)− p1(r)|+
1
2
|f(r)− p2(r)|
and therefore
1
2
|f(r)− p1(r)| =
1
2
|f(r)− p2(r)| = 0.
Then p1(r) = f(r) = p2(r), and therefore p1(r) − p2(r) = 0. p1 − p2 is a
polynomial of degree at most n which is 0 at every zero of f − p. The only
polynomial of degree at most n which has n + 1 zeros is 0, so p1 − p2 must
be constantly 0, and therefore p1 = p2. 
3. Rates of Unicity
Not all uniqueness results are created equal. Once we know there is a
unique approximation, we can ask for more detailed quantitative information
about the approximation.
Definition 3.1. p ∈ Pn is a ǫ-nearly best approximation to f in Pn if for
every q ∈ Pn,
||f − p||1 < ||f − q||1 + ǫ.
We know that two best approximations in Pn must be equal, so the anal-
ogous question to ask is whether ǫ-nearly best approximations must be near
each other. More precisely, we look for a function Φf such that if p1 and p2
are Φf (δ)-nearly best approximations then ||p1 − p2||1 < δ. Such a function
Φf is known as a modulus of uniqueness for f .
It’s clear from the definition that if there is any modulus of uniqueness
then there are many functions meeting the definition (for instance, if Φf is
a modulus of uniqueness for f and Ψ(δ) ≥ Φf (δ) for every δ then Ψ is also a
modulus of uniqueness for f). However if there is a unique best approxima-
tion to f , we would expect that there is a “nice” modulus of uniqueness—
one that is continuous, at least from one side, and where limδ→0 Φf (δ) = 0.
The optimal modulus has these properties under suitable conditions, and
is sometimes called "the" modulus of uniqueness. An arbitrary modulus of
uniqueness, however, need not be so nice. The particular case where cδ is
a modulus of uniqueness for some constant c is called strong unicity, and is
well-studied in approximation theory (again, see [12]).
A second type of quantitative information is the stability of the mean
approximation under small changes to the function. Let us write A for the
functional mapping f to its best approximation in P. When ||f − f ′||1 ≤
ǫ, what can we say about ||A(f) − A(f ′)||1? A modulus of uniqueness
immediately answers this question.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose f, f ′ have unique mean approximations in P, Φf is
the modulus of uniqueness for f , and ||f − f ′||1 <
1
2Φf (δ). Then ||A(f) −
A(f ′)||1 < δ.
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Proof. Suppose ||f − f ′||1 <
1
2Φf (δ). For any q ∈ P,
||f −A(f ′)||1 ≤ ||f − f
′||1 + ||f
′ −A(f ′)||1
≤ ||f − f ′||1 + ||f
′ − q||1
≤ 2||f − f ′||1 + ||f − q||1
< ||f − q||1 +Φf (δ).
Therefore A(f ′) is a Φf (δ)-nearly best approximation to f , and since Φf is
a modulus of uniqueness,
||A(f)−A(f ′)||1 < δ.

Our goal in the remainder of this section is to find a modulus of uniqueness
corresponding to Jackson’s Theorem, closely following [33]. More precisely,
we want to find a modulus corresponding to the particular proof given in the
previous section—we think of this as the process of making our arguments
more quantitative: instead of working with best approximations, we’ll work
with nearly best approximations; instead of working with non-zero values,
we’ll include numerical bounds on how large the values must be; and so on.
We begin with a simple (but, as it turns out, essential) observation: if
||p||1 > 2||f ||1 then ||f − 0||1 < ||f − p||1, and therefore when consider-
ing approximations, we can consider only those polynomials which satisfy
||p||1 ≤ 2||f ||1.
Definition 3.3. Qn ⊆ Pn is the set of polynomials p of degree ≤ n such
that ||p||1 ≤ 2||f ||1.
In particular, the best approximation to f must belong to Qn. From here
on we will restrict our attention to Qn.
3.1. A Quantitative Lemma 2.8. We can expect that in order to obtain
a quantitative version of the main theorem, we’ll need quantitative versions
of the intermediate lemmas as well. We’ll start, naturally, with Lemma 2.8;
we need to strengthen the conclusion so that ||g−λh||1 + δ < ||g||1 for some
fixed value δ.
Of course, the stronger conclusion isn’t true unless we make stronger
assumptions as well—in order to get a quantitative conclusion, we’ll need
quantitative assumptions. We look through the proof to find out which steps
contribute to the size of the gap between ||g||1 and ||g−λh||1, and then take
steps to bound those values.
The actual guarantee that the gap exists is given by (4), where we can
see that the size of the gap is λ(|
∫
A h sgn g dx| −
∫
B |h| dx). This gives us
two values we need to bound away from 0: λ and |
∫
A h sgn g dx| −
∫
B |h| dx.
The latter is shown to be positive at (3); from this and (2), we can see that
there are two factors contributing to the size of |
∫
A h sgn g dx| −
∫
B |h| dx:
the size of |
∫
h sgn g dx| and the size of
∫
B |h(x)| dx. The first of these is
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simply one of our assumptions: instead of making the qualitative assump-
tion that
∫
h sgn g dx 6= 0, we will make a quantitative assumption that
|
∫
h sgn g dx| ≥ θ for some appropriate θ.
We turn to the bound on
∫
B |h(x)| dx. The bound on this value is given
by (1), where it is established that
∫
B
|h(x)| dx ≤ ||h||∞ · k · 2ǫ.
A bound on ||h||∞ is just an additional assumption, as is a particular value
for k, but ǫ is some value we have chosen. As long as we are willing to make ǫ
small, we can make
∫
B |h(x)| dx as small as we want. So as we make ǫ smaller,
we make
∫
B |h(x)| dx smaller, and therefore seem to make ||g||1 − ||g− λh||1
larger. However when we turn to λ, we will see that making ǫ small may
force λ to be small, which makes ||g||1 − ||g − λh||1 small.
λ was given by the rule that λ||h||∞ < m = inf{|g(x)| | x ∈ A}, so to
keep λ bounded away from 0, we need to bound m away from 0. But here
we run into a problem: what if g has a point which dips very close to 0, but
isn’t near any of the zeros? Then this point is included in the set A, but it
forces m to be very small, which in turn forces λ to be small, and therefore
causes ||g − λh||1 to be very close to ||g||1.
Suppose gζ is a function which “almost” has a zero—say, gζ(x) = (x −
1/2)2 + ζ where ζ is very small. If we take the proof given in the previous
section at face value, ζ being small just forces us to choose λζ very small.
Indeed, following this argument, as ζ approaches 0, the gap ||gζ ||1 − ||gζ −
λζh||1 approaches 0 as well.
When ζ reaches 0, however, the situation changes. Now 1/2 is a zero of
g0(x), and λ only has to be concerned with the value of g0(x) when x is
outside the interval (1/2 − ǫ, 1/2 + ǫ). In particular, we can still choose a
value λ0 so that ||g0||1 − ||g0 − λ0h||1 > 0. It turns out to be a general
principle that quantitative results ought not exhibit such discontinuities—
all parameters in our proof should vary continuously in the function g. It
is therefore not surprising that we can easily modify our proof to eliminate
this discontinuity: when ζ is very small, we could make ||gζ ||1−||gζ −λζh||1
larger by treating 1/2 as if it were a zero and removing the interval around
it. This has a price (it makes k larger, because we have a new zero, which
in turn makes
∫
B |h(x)| dx larger, and therefore |
∫
A h sgn g dx| −
∫
B |h| dx
smaller), but when ζ is very small, we still obtain better bounds this way.
Instead of assuming that g has finitely many zeros, we’ll assume there are
finitely many points where the value is below some parameter ζ (with the
number of such points and the size of ζ contributing to our ultimate bound
on ||g||1 − ||g − λh||1). Stated like this, we still don’t have the formulation
quite right, since when g is continuous, having any zeros at all will lead to
having uncountably many points below ζ; clearly having many small points
“close togther” doesn’t count. We will remove a small interval around each
almost-zero, so what matters—what forces the set B to be large—is if there
10 HENRY TOWSNER
are many points close to 0 which are separated by large gaps. It is more
convenient to jump to our ultimate purpose, and simply require that there
is a set B of measure at most ǫ containing all points r with |g(r)| < ζ.
We can now prove this quantitative formulation using essentially the same
argument as in the proof of Lemma 2.8, but filling in explicit calculations
where appropriate.
Lemma 3.4. Let g, h, ǫ, ζ be given such that:
• g and h are L1-functions,
• ǫ > 0 and ζ > 0,
• |
∫
h sgn g dx| ≥ 3Kǫ,
• ||h||∞ ≤ K,
• There is a set B of measure at most ǫ such that if |g(x)| < ζ then
x ∈ B.
Then
||g −
ζ
2K
h||1 + ǫ
ζ
2
≤ ||g||1.
Proof. Let A = [0, 1] \B. We have∫
B
|h| dx ≤ Kǫ.
We have ∣∣∣∣
∫
A
h sgn g dx
∣∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣
∫
h sgn g dx
∣∣∣∣−
∫
B
|h| dx ≥ 2Kǫ
and therefore ∣∣∣∣
∫
A
h sgn g dx
∣∣∣∣−
∫
B
|h| dx ≥ Kǫ.
Note that if x ∈ A then |g(x)| ≥ ζ. Let λ = ζ2K . Then for any x ∈ A,
|λh(x)| ≤ ζ2 < ζ ≤ |g(x)|. In particular, sgn g(x) = sgn(g(x) − λh(x)) for
every x ∈ A. Then, by the same calculations as in the proof of Lemma 2.8,
||g − λh||1 ≤ ||g||1 − λ
(∣∣∣∣
∫
A
h sgn g dx
∣∣∣∣−
∫
B
|h(x)| dx
)
≤ ||g||1 − ǫ
ζ
2
.

3.2. A Quantitative Lemma 2.9. We now turn to formulating a quan-
titative version of Lemma 2.9. We would expect to need a quantitative
version of Lemma 2.10 to derive (5). In fact, a particularly nice version
which suffices for our purposes is available in the existing literature:
Theorem 3.5 (Markov brothers’ Inequality2). If p has degree ≤ n, ||p′||∞ ≤
2n2||p||∞.
2This inequality is sometimes called just “Markov’s inequality”, but as that name is
also used for an inequality from probability theory, this name is perhaps less confusing.
The inequality given here was proven by Andrey Markov, the same one who gave his name
to the other Markov’s inequality. His younger brother Vladimir, also a mathematician,
proved a generalization to multiple derivatives, leading to the name given here, which,
properly, applies only to the generalization.
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An immediate consequence of this is
Lemma 3.6. If p has degree ≤ n, ||p||∞ ≤ 2(n + 1)
2||p||1.
Proof. Let q(x) =
∫ x
0 p(y) dy be the integral of p. Applying Markov’s in-
equality to q gives
||p||∞ ≤ 2(n + 1)
2||q||∞
= 2(n + 1)2 sup
x
∣∣∣∣
∫ x
0
p(y) dy
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2(n + 1)2 sup
x
∫ x
0
|p(y)| dy
= 2(n + 1)2
∫ 1
0
|p(y)| dy
= 2(n + 1)2||p||1.

As for stating a quantitative version of Lemma 2.9, our work in the previ-
ous subsection gives us a good guess what will need to happen: we will need
to replace the assumption that p is a best approximation with the assump-
tion that p is a nearly best approximation, and the conclusion that f−p has
n zeros with the conclusion that f − p has a collection of n “almost” zeros
which are well spread out.
Lemma 3.7. Suppose f is continuous and p is a ζ20(n+2)2 -nearly best ap-
proximation to f in Qn. Then there are n + 1 points r1 < · · · < rn+1 such
that ri+1 − ri ≥
1
20(n+2)2n for i < n + 1 and |f(ri) − p(ri)| ≤ ζ for each
i ≤ n+ 1.
Proof. Let θ = 120(n+2)2n , ǫ =
1
10(n+2)2 , and g(x) = f(x)−p(x). Suppose the
conclusion is false; then there must be some k ≤ n and some r′1 < · · · < r
′
k
such that |g(r′i)| ≤ ζ for each i ≤ k, but whenever |g(r)| ≤ ζ for any
r ∈ [0, 1], there is some i ≤ k such that |r − r′i| < θ. In particular, the set
B =
⋃
i≤k(r
′
i − θ, r
′
i + θ) contains all points r with |g(r)| ≤ ζ. Observe that
µ(B) ≤ 2nθ = 110(n+2)2 = ǫ.
If r′i + θ < r
′
i+1 − θ then, since g(x) is continuous, g does not change
sign on the interval [r′i + θ, r
′
i+1 − θ]. So all sign changes take place in some
interval (r′i − θ, r
′
i + θ). We choose a subsequence r1, . . . , rm and consider
the polynomial
h′(x) =
m∏
i=1
(x− ri).
By choosing the subsequence ri appropriately, we can ensure that h(x) =
(−1)bh′(x) has the same sign as g(x) whenever x 6∈ B. (Saying this precisely
is tricky: roughly, we want to include r′i in our list if sgn g(r
′
i−θ) 6= sgn g(r
′
i+
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θ), but the situation is complicated by the fact that we could have r′i+1−θ <
r′i+1+ θ) and have the sign change occur somewhere in that interval; in that
case we would want to include either of r′i and r
′
i+1, but not both.) Let
K = ||h||∞; by Lemma 3.6, ||h||1 ≥
K
2(n+1)2
.
On the other hand, we have∣∣∣∣
∫
B
h sgn g dx
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∫
B
|h(x)| dx ≤ Kµ(B) = Kǫ,
and, taking A = [0, 1] \B,
||h||1 =
∫
|h(x)| dx =
∫
A
|h(x)| dx +
∫
B
|h(x)| dx
Putting these together gives∫
A
|h(x)| dx ≥
K
2(n + 1)2
−
K
10(n + 1)2
=
2K
5(n + 1)2
.
Therefore ∣∣∣∣
∫
h sgn g dx
∣∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣
∫
A
h sgn g dx
∣∣∣∣−
∫
B
|h(x)| dx
=
∫
A
|h(x)| dx −
∫
B
|h(x)| dx
≥
2K
5(n + 1)2
−
K
10(n + 1)2
=
3K
10(n + 1)2
≥ 3Kǫ.
Therefore we may apply Lemma 3.4 and conclude that there is a λ so
that ||g − λh||1 + ǫ
ζ
2 ≤ ||g||1, contradicting the assumption that p was a
ζ
20(n+1)2 -nearly best approximation. 
3.3. A Quantitative Lemma 2.10. We now turn to Lemma 2.10. We re-
placed one use of this lemma with the Markov brothers’ inequality, but there
is a second use, in the proof of the main theorem, which cannot be replaced
by the Markov brothers’ inequality (since that only applies to polynomials).
In its qualitative form, this lemma seems like an obvious fact about inte-
grals, but we now need a quantitative version. A quantitative formulation
should weaken the assumption to merely
∫
|q(x)| dx ≤ ǫ for some bound ǫ.
Of course, we can no longer hope to have q(x) = 0 for every x, since we
can easily think of continuous functions which have small but non-zero inte-
grals but are not always 0. Therefore we expect to weaken the conclusion as
well—instead of having ||q||∞ = 0, we might hope to show that ||q||∞ < δ
for some value δ.
We can easily imagine continuous functions q with ||q||1 small but ||q||∞
quite large: q could be 0 except on a small “bump” where it gets very large.
By making the bump very narrow, we can let the bump be very tall, causing
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||q||∞ to be large even though ||q||1 is staying small. These bumps don’t
create discontinuity, but it’s not unreasonable to say that a function with
a tall, thin bump is “less” continuous than functions without such features.
We can quantify this effect:
Definition 3.8. Let q be a continuous L1 function. A modulus of uniform
continuity of q is a function ωq(ǫ) such that for any ǫ > 0 and any x, y ∈ [0, 1]
such that |y − x| < ωq(ǫ), |q(y)− q(x)| < ǫ.
It’s not hard to see that the modulus of uniform continuity is sufficient
to give a quantitative version of the lemma: if |q(x)| ≥ ǫ for some x, the
modulus of uniform continuity ensures that |q(y)| ≥ ǫ/2 when y is near x,
and this ensure that
∫
|q(x)| dx cannot be too small. To make this precise:
Lemma 3.9. Let q be a function with modulus of continuity ωq and∫
|q| dx <
ǫ
2
·min{
1
2
, ωq(ǫ/2)}.
Then ||q||∞ < ǫ.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. If |q(x)| ≥ ǫ then for every y with
|y − x| < ωq(ǫ/2), |q(y)| > ǫ/2. We cannot be sure the whole interval
(x− ωq(ǫ/2), x+ ωq(ǫ/2)) belongs to [0, 1], but setting η = min{
1
2 , ωq(ǫ/2)},
we can be sure that if x < 1/2 then (x, x+ η) ⊆ [0, 1], while if x ≥ 1/2 then
(x− η, x) ⊆ [0, 1]. The two cases are symmetric, so consider the case where
x < 1/2, and therefore∫
|q(x)| dx =
∫ x
0
|q(x)| dx +
∫ x+η
x
|q(x)| dx +
∫ 1
x+η
|q(x)| dx
> 0 + (ǫ/2)η + 0
≥ (ǫ/2)η.

Now when we apply Lemma 3.9, we need to know the modulus of conti-
nuity for the function we apply the lemma to. The only application in our
proof not covered by the Markov brothers’ inequality is to the function
1
2
|f(x)− p1(x)|+
1
2
|f(x)− p2(x)| − |f(x)− p(x)|.
f is a function given to us; it is no surprise that our bounds will depend
on modulus of continuity of f , so we’ll include as an assumption that we are
given particular bounds on the modulus of continuity of f .
For the polynomials p1, p2, we can use a combination of the Markov broth-
ers’ inequality and the fact that we restricted our polynomials to those in
Qn to obtain a modulus of continuity. (This is where we use the fact that
we are optimizing over Qn instead of Pn.)
Lemma 3.10. Let p ∈ Qn. Then ωp(ǫ) =
ǫ
4n2(n+1)2||f ||1
is a modulus of
uniform continuity for p.
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Proof. p is differentiable, so for any x < y in [0, 1],
|p(y)− p(x)| ≤
∣∣∣∣
∫ y
x
p′(z) dz
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (y − x)||p′||∞.
Applying the Markov brothers’ inequality to p′, we have
||p′||∞ ≤ 2n
2||p||∞ ≤ 2n
2(n+ 1)2||p||1 ≤ 4n
2(n+ 1)2||f ||1.
Therefore for any x < y,
|p(y)− p(x)| ≤ 4n2(n+ 1)2||f ||1(y − x)
and so the function ωp(ǫ) =
ǫ
4n2(n+1)2||f ||1
is a modulus of uniform continuity
for p. 
The function we ultimately need is a linear combination of absolute values
of functions. It suffices to observe the following:
Lemma 3.11. Let f, g be functions, let c be a constant, and let ωf , ωg be
corresponding moduli of uniform continuity. Then:
(1) ωf is a modulus of uniform continuity for |f(x)|,
(2) ωcf (ǫ) = ωf (ǫ/|c|) is a modulus of uniform continuity for cf(x),
(3) ωf+g(ǫ) = min{ωf (ǫ/2), ωg(ǫ/2)} is a modulus of uniform continuity
for f(x) + g(x).
Proof. (1) Suppose |y − x| < ωf (ǫ). Then ||f(y)| − |f(x)|| ≤ |f(y) −
f(x)| < ǫ.
(2) Suppose |y−x| < ωf(ǫ/c). Then |cf(y)−cf(x)| = |c|·|f(y)−f(x)| <
|c|ǫ/|c| = ǫ
(3) Suppose |x− y| < min{ωf (ǫ/2), ωg(ǫ/2)}. Then
|(f + g)(x) − (f + g)(y)| ≤ |f(x)− f(y)|+ |g(x) − g(y)| < ǫ/2 + ǫ/2 = ǫ.

By the same argument, we may replace the last item in the lemma with
ωf+g+h(ǫ) = min{ωf (ǫ/3), ωg(ǫ/3), ωh(ǫ/3)} for the sume of three functions.
3.4. A Quantitative Version of Jackson’s Theorem. Finally, we turn
to the main theorem, Theorem 2.11. We know that we need to strengthen
the assumption by stipulating a modulus of continuity for the function f ,
and that in exchange we expect to calculate a modulus of uniqueness for the
approximation of f in Qn.
Once again, we go through the proof systematically adding quantitative
information to statements. Suppose that instead of being best approxima-
tions, p1 and p2 are ǫ-nearly best approximations. Our goal is to obtain
some kind of bound on ||p1 − p2||1. The function p(x) =
1
2(p1(x) + p2(x)) is
no longer a best approximation, but it is still an ǫ-nearly best approximation.
As a result, the function
q(x) =
1
2
|f(x)− p1(x)|+
1
2
|f(x)− p2(x)| − |f(x)− p(x)|
A WORKED EXAMPLE OF THE FUNCTIONAL INTERPRETATION 15
is still non-negative, and has a small (but not necessarily 0) integral.
The main difference is that we will ultimately obtain points r1, . . . , rn+1
with the property that |p1(r)− p2(r)| is small, but not necessarily 0. In the
qualitative version, we used the presence of n + 1 zeros, and the fact that
p1 − p2 was a polynomial of degree at most n, to conclude that p1 − p2 was
constantly 0. A quantitative version should allow us to conclude from the
presence of n + 1 “well-separated almost-zeros” that p1 − p2 is close to the
constantly 0 polynomial.
We know that n+ 1 points are enough to specify a polynomial of degree
at most n, so if we write down any polynomial of degree at most n going
through all the points (ri, p1(ri) − p2(ri)), we will have written down the
polynomial p1 − p2. We just need to express this polynomial in a way that
makes explicit that the polynomial is always small. As it happens, one of
the most common ways of writing down a polynomial from its zeros has
precisely this property: the Lagrange interpolant is given by
L(x) =
n+1∑
i=1
(p1(ri)− p2(ri))
∏
j 6=i
x− rj
ri − rj
.
Observe that for any k, for each i 6= k the term
∏
j 6=i
rk−rj
ri−rj
is 0, and therefore
L(rk) = (p1(rk)− p2(rk))
∏
j 6=k
rk − rj
rk − rj
= p1(rk)− p2(rk),
so the Lagrange interpolant does goes through the desired points. It is also
clear that we have retained exactly enough information about the points
(ri, p1(ri)− p2(ri)) to place a bound on ||L||∞: we know that each p1(ri)−
p2(ri) is small and that as long as j 6= i, rj − ri is not too small.
Stated formally, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 3.12. Let f be a function with modulus of continuity ωf . Then
for any n,
Φf (ǫ) =
ζ
2
min{
1
10(n + 2)2
, ωf (ζ/12),
ζ
24n2(n + 1)2||f ||1
}
where ζ = ǫ
4(n+1)20n(n+2)2nnn
, is a modulus of uniqueness for the approxima-
tion by Qn.
Proof. We fix some values: γ = 120(n+2)2n , υ =
ǫγn
n+1 , ζ = υ/4, and ρ =
ζ
2 min{
1
10(n+2)2 , ωf (ζ/12),
ζ
24n2(n+1)2||f ||1
}.
Let p1, p2 be ρ-nearly best approximations to f in Qn. Let p(x) =
1
2(p1(x) + p2(x)). p is also an ρ-nearly best approximation to f since
||f − p||1 ≤
1
2
||f − p1||1 +
1
2
||f − p2||1.
This means the equation (6) gets weakened to∫
1
2
|f(x)− p1(x)|+
1
2
|f(x)− p2(x)| − |f(x)− p(x)| dx < ρ.
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But (7),
1
2
|f(x)− p1(x)|+
1
2
|f(x)− p2(x)| − |f(x)− p(x)| ≥ 0,
is still valid.
Let
q(x) =
1
2
|f(x)− p1(x)|+
1
2
|f(x)− p2(x)| − |f(x)− p(x)|.
We wish to apply Lemma 3.9, which requires a modulus of continuity. We
have the modulus ωf for f and the modulus ωp(δ) =
δ
4n2(n+1)2||f ||1
for p, p1,
and p2, so we may apply Lemma 3.11 to obtain the modulus of continuity
ωq(δ) = min{ωf (δ/6),
δ
12n2(n+ 1)2||f ||1
}.
In particular, ρ ≤ ζ2 min{1/2, ωq(ζ/2)}, so by Lemma 3.9, we must have
||q||∞ < ζ.
ρ ≤ ζ20(n+2)2 , so by Lemma 3.7, we have n+1 points r1 < · · · < rn+1 such
that ri+1 − ri ≥ γ for i < n + 1 and |f(ri) − p(ri)| ≤ ζ for each i ≤ n + 1.
Therefore for each i ≤ n+ 1,
|p1(ri)− p2(ri)| ≤ |f(ri)− p1(ri)|+ |f(ri)− p2(ri)|
≤ 2 [q(ri) + |f(ri)− p(ri)|]
< 2[ζ + ζ]
= υ.
The Lagrange interpolant gives us an expression for the polynomial p1(x)−
p2(x):
p1(x)− p2(x) =
n+1∑
i=1
(p1(ri)− p2(ri))
∏
j 6=i
x− rj
ri − rj
.
We may bound this:
|p1(x)− p2(x)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n+1∑
i=1
(p1(ri)− p2(ri))
∏
j 6=i
x− rj
ri − rj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
n+1∑
i=1
|p1(ri)− p2(ri)|
∏
j 6=i
|x− rj|
|ri − rj |
<
n+1∑
i=1
υγ−n
= nυγ−n
= ǫ,
and therefore
||p1 − p2||1 =
∫
|p1 − p2| dx < ǫ.
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
An additional merit of this proof is then we have obtained information
on the uniformity of the bounds: we now know if that if someone gives us
only ωf and ||f ||1, we can compute a modulus Φ which will work for any
function g for which ωf is a modulus of continuity and with ||g||1 ≤ ||f ||1.
4. The Functional Interpretation
We have now seen that it was possible not only to prove an explicit quanti-
tative version of Jackson’s Theorem, but to find such a proof closely related
to the qualitative proof. Still, the arguments we used appeared to be some-
what ad hoc, and we seem to have gotten lucky in various places. We made a
string of fortunate guesses, for instance replacing Pn with Qn, or strengthen-
ing the assumption of Lemma 3.4, and therefore weakening the conclusion of
Lemma 3.7, in a way which just so happened to allow us to finish the proof
anyway. We also depended on existing arguments, like the Markov brothers’
inequality and the properties of the Lagrange interpolant, to complete our
quantitative proof.
Our goal in this section is to describe a formalization of the procedure
used in the previous section which applies systematically to certain kinds
of proofs. (Indeed, this method is precisely the way the arguments in the
previous section were found by Kohlenbach and Oliva.)
In order to make this precise, we need to pin down what counts as a
quantitative calculation. For our purposes, we will identify “quantitative”
with “computable”. Then our goal in this section is to describe how to
systematically take a proof of a statement and:
(1) Find a related statement for which it is appropriate to investigate
the existence of computable bounds,
(2) Convert the proof into a calculation of those computable bounds.
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the things that makes the func-
tional interpretation useful in practice is that we can take two different
perspectives on it. In the first perspective, the functional interpretation is
a completely formal idea; it refers to a family of theorems of the following
form:
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that there is a proof of φ in the formal theory T .
Then there is a proof of φND in the formal theorem T ′.
Here T is some particular formal theory, T ′ is a theory related to T but
with the additional property that proofs in T ′ are constructive, and ·ND
is an operation mapping formulas of first-order logic to formulas in some
particular nice form. The main reason we view these theorems as instances
of a uniform idea is that the transformation φ 7→ φND is very similar across
all these theorems. Such theorems have been proven for a variety of theories
T .
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The second perspective is that the functional interpretation is a heuristic:
across many theories and situations, there is an operation which takes any
formula φ (in particular, where there may be no computable bounds at all
for φ) and transforms φ to φND, a statement for which computable bounds
do exist, which is reliably implication preserving—if we can conclude ψ from
φ then we can also conclude ψND from φND. Since we can convert individual
mathematical statements into formulas φ without too much difficulty, we can
also convert mathematical statements into the quantitative formula φND.
Taking the first perspective would require choosing a suitable formal the-
ory T , often the theory of Peano arithmetic or a variant, and carefully
formalizing our statement in this theory. This tends to involve a great deal
of tedious coding—one must interpret statements about the real numbers
as statements about sequences of integers, statements about integration as
formulas involving quantification over partitions, and so on. Nonetheless,
the formal approach is often useful, and can give insights that the informal
approach cannot.
Here, however, we will take the second approach, and work only semi-
formally. We will use the notation of first-order logic, but deal somewhat
informally with our exact choice of formal language and theory.
4.1. Formalizing Statements. The first thing we need to do is translate
ordinary mathematical language into the more formal language of first-order
logic. As promised, we will work semi-formally, writing formulas using quan-
tifiers ∀,∃ and the connectives ∧ (and), ∨ (or), and→ (implies), but without
pinning down an exact language. In particular, we will freely write things
like ∀q ∈ Q ∃n ∈ N . . . to indicate quantification over various particular
domains.
In order to get meaningful results, we do need some restrictions on the
formulas we use. (These restrictions stand in for actually formalizing a
statement in a particular fixed language—essentially, the restrictions we are
choosing are the ones which ensure that a proper formalization is possible.)
The most important restriction is that we only quantify over countable do-
mains. Since Jackson’s theorem concerns notions like functions on the reals,
this seems like a significant limitation. We will work around this by taking
advantage of the fact that many of the uncountable domains we are inter-
ested in (like the reals) are separable, and therefore many statements can
be approximated by quantifying over the countable dense subset.
We will write Q+ for Q∩ (0,∞), which is one such countable domain. We
will write PQn for the polynomials of degree at most n with rational coeffi-
cients (which, of course, are dense in Pn under an appropriate topology).
In addition, we need a restriction on our atomic formulas. The correct
restriction is that our atomic formulas should represent only computable
operations; making sense of that formally would require giving computable
interpretations to things like real numbers and functions on real numbers.
We will take a short-cut: our atomic formulas φ(x) (where x is one or more
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free variables) will always have the form f(x) < ǫ or f(x) ≤ ǫ where f is
some continuous function. (This is closely related to continuous logic [5].)
Having just imposed the requirement that we work with countable do-
mains, we will immediately allow a single exception: we allow a single, out-
ermost universal quantifier over an uncountable domain. That is, we work
with formulas of the form
∀X ∈ U φ(X)
where U may be uncountable, but all quantifiers in φ must be over countable
domains.3
To illustrate the idea, let us consider how we translate the uniqueness
part of Jackson’s theorem into a formula of the specified form. In English,
the uniqueness part of Jackson’s theorem says
Let f be a continuous L1-function on [0, 1]. Then for any n,
there is at most one best approximation to f in Pn.
The collection of all continuous L1-functions is uncountable, but we can
include f in the outermost uncountable quantifier. We will have to write
formulas involving the values of x, so we want to be able to quantifier over
the domain of f ; we can take the outermost quantifier over RQ∩[0,1], since a
continuous function is determined by its values at the rationals.
We first need a formula cont(f), which should hold exactly when f is
continuous. The usual ǫ-δ formulation of continuity would be appropriate,
but since [0, 1] is compact, continuity is equivalent to uniform continuity,
which will slightly simplify things later. So we take
cont(f) ≡ ∀ǫ ∈ Q+ ∃δ ∈ Q+ ∀x, y ∈ Q∩[0, 1] (|x− y| < δ → |f(x)− f(y)| < ǫ) .
Saying f is L1 is easy:
L1(f) ≡ ∃M
∫
|f(x)|dx < M.
Note that we insist on expanding cont(f) into the ǫ-δ form but are willing
to treat
∫
|f(x)|dx < M as a single statement, rather than writing it out in
terms of a partition.
We would like the conclusion to say that if p1, p2 are best approximations
of f then p1 = p2. But the real best approximation might not have rational
coefficients, and we only want to quantify over PQn . We therefore want to
reformulate the statement that there is a best approximation in terms of
PQn .
Suppose there were distinct best approximations; then there would be
p1, p2 with ||p1−p2||1 > ǫ for some ǫ. Since each of p1, p2 are arbitrarily well
approximated by elements of PQn , we could find p
′
1, p
′
2 ∈ P
Q
n with ||p
′
i − p1||1
arbitrarily small—and therefore p′i a δ-nearly best approximation for δ as
3This is actually a harmless modification. Formally, we could augment our language
of first-order logic by a new predicate or function symbol, X. Since there are no defining
axioms for X, proving a formula φ(X) is equivalent to proving ∀X ∈ U φ(X).
20 HENRY TOWSNER
small as we want—and with ||p′1 − p
′
2||1 > ǫ. Therefore we should state that
this does not happen:
approx(f) ≡ ∀ǫ ∈ Q+ ∃δ ∈ Q+ ∀p′1 ∈ P
Q
n ∀p
′
2 ∈ P
Q
n
[||p′1 − p
′
2||1 > ǫ→ ∃p
′ ∈ PQn
(||f − p′||1 + δ ≤ ||f − p
′
1||1
∨ ||f − p′||1 + δ ≤ ||f − p
′
2||1)].
Putting this all together, the uniqueness part of Jackson’s theorem is:
(8) ∀f ∈ RQ∩[0,1] (cont(f) ∧ L1(f)→ approx(f)) .
4.2. Extracting Quantitative Statements. Once we have placed a for-
mula in the form
∀x∃y φ(x, y)
where x and y may be tuples of multiple variables, there is a natural way
to identify a potential quantitative analog of this formula: replace the ex-
istence of y with some calculated value—∀xφ(x, g(x)) for some reasonable
function g. In practice, computing exact values is often messy, so it usually
enough to settle for some kind of bound: ∀x∃y ∈ G(x)φ(x, y), where G(x)
is always some sort of bounded (really, compact) set. In the simplest, but
representative, case, y ranges over the natural numbers and G(x) always has
the form [0, n], so G(x) really gives a bound on the size of y
The functional interpretation depends on the fact that whether or not
there is a computable g is closely related to the syntactic properties of φ: if
every quantifier in φ is over a compact domain (and our formalization was
appropriate) then there is guaranteed to be a computable g. Conversely, if
there is a computable bound g then there must be some formula equivalent
to g which contains only quantifiers over compact domains. (The one com-
plication to this equivalence is that when φ has quantifiers over non-compact
domains, there is no easy way to tell whether it is equivalent to a simpler
formula).
To see why this should be the case, consider the simplest situation: x and y
are natural numbers and φ is a formula of arithmetic, where the only domain
being quantified over is the natural numbers. If all quantifiers in φ are over
compact subsets of the natural numbers then all quantifiers in φ are really
over finite sets. The atomic formulas should themselves be computable, and
therefore there is a computer program which, given values n,m, checks in
finite time whether or not φ(n,m) is true. If ∀x∃yφ(x, y) is true then g is
a computable function: given the input n, g(n) first checks whether φ(n, 0)
holds; if so, g(n) returns 0, and otherwise, g(n) checks whether φ(n, 1) holds,
if so returns 1, and if not continues similarly. (The standard encoding of
computability in arithmetic gives the other half of a correspondence—any
computable function can be converted into a formula of the right form.)
When we deal with more complicated spaces, as in the previous subsection,
we want to distinguish between compact and non-compact quantifiers even
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while both are countable. For instance, we usually want quantifiers over
Q to be non-compact while quantifiers over Q ∩ [0, 1] should be seen as
compact. So in place of quantifiers over compact domains, we sometimes
need quantifiers over countable dense subsets of compact domains. This
could be ambiguous—every set is dense in some compact space (indeed, the
one-point compactification adds only a single point); however a choice of
topology is enforced by our choice of atomic formulas, which would not be
continuous with respect to the wrong compactification.
For our purposes, we adopt the following convention: we call a set effec-
tively compact if it is a countable dense subset of a compact set (where the
atomic formulas we are interested in come from functions which are contin-
uous with respect to the same topology). In practice, the only effectively
compact sets we are concerned with are obvious ones: Q ∩ [a, b] and the set
of polynomials of degree ≤ n with coefficients from Q ∩ [a, b]. These are
clearly dense in the corresponding compact sets [a, b] and the polynomials
of degree ≤ n with coefficients from [a, b], respectively.
Note that effectively compact sets allow finite searches the same way finite
sets did: suppose D is the underlying, uncountable, compact space and Q ⊆
D is a countable dense subset, and we want to check whether ∃x ∈ Dφ(c, x)
holds for some fixed constants c ∈ D. We can choose a finite set F ⊆ Q
which is sufficiently dense (based on the moduli of uniform continuity of the
atomic formulas in φ) and check, for each d ∈ F , whether φ(c, d) holds.
A formula in the form ∀x∃yφ(x, y) where φ only has quantifiers over
effectively compact domains is called a Π2 formula. (The Π indicates that
the outermost quantifier is ∀ and the 2 indicates that there are two blocks
of quantifiers over non-compact domains.)
Let’s consider what this means for Jackson’s Theorem. The formula (8)
we found above isn’t in the Π2 form yet. Recall that in the previous section
we replaced the space Pn with the space Qn. Now we see what motivated
this change: while the space Pn is not compact, Qn is compact; the corre-
sponding QQn is a countable set dense in the compact separable space Qn,
so by replacing the quantifiers over PQn with quantifiers over Q
Q
n , we bring
Jackson’s theorem closer to the Π2 form. In fact, with this change, the
conclusion of the formula is now in the right form:
∀ǫ ∈ Q+ ∃δ ∈ Q+ ∀p′1 ∈ Q
Q
n ∀p
′
2 ∈ Q
Q
n
[||p′1 − p
′
2||1 > ǫ→ ∃p
′ ∈ QQn
(||f − p′||1 + δ ≤ ||f − p
′
1||1
∨ ||f − p′||1 + δ ≤ ||f − p
′
2||1)].
We define the formula:
approxQ(f, ǫ, δ) ≡ ∀p′1 ∈ Q
Q
n ∀p
′
2 ∈ Q
Q
n
[||p′1 − p
′
2||1 > ǫ→ ∃p
′ ∈ QQn
(||f − p′||1 + δ ≤ ||f − p
′
1||1
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∨ ||f − p′||1 + δ ≤ ||f − p
′
2||1)].
To deal with the assumptions cont(f) and L1(f), we use a technique called
Skolemization. The idea is to replace statements like
∀x ∈ Q ∃y ∈ Qφ(x, y)
with the equivalent statement
∃Y ∈ QQ ∀x ∈ Qφ(x, Y (x)).
In other words, we can move existential quantifiers outwards by replacing
them with functions. For example, we can rewrite cont(f) as:
∃ω ∈ (Q+)Q
+
∀ǫ ∈ Q+∀x, y ∈ Q ∩ [0, q](|x − y| < ω(ǫ)→ |f(x)− f(y)| < ǫ).
ω should look familar: this is just the statement that ω is a modulus of
uniform continuity for f . We write
ucont(f, ω) ≡ ∀ǫ ∈ Q+∀x, y ∈ Q ∩ [0, q](|x− y| < ω(ǫ)→ |f(x)− f(y)| < ǫ).
Both ∃δ ∈ Q+approxQ(f, ǫ, δ) and ¬ucont(f, ω) have the form ∃yφ(y) where
φ(y) has only quantifiers over effectively compact domains. Then we can
rewrite Jackson’s theorem as
∀f ∈ RQ∩[0,1]∀ωf ∈ (Q
+)Q
+
∀M∀ǫ ∈ Q+[¬ucont(f, ω)∨∫
|f(x)|dx ≥M∨
∃δ ∈ Q+approxQ(f, ǫ, δ)].
So we have converted Jackson’s theorem into a Π2 form. (Notice that Skolem-
ization doesn’t trivialize the importance of the Π2 form, because the ∃ quan-
tifier in the Π2 form is still supposed to range over a countable domain.)
Without going any further, we’ve already learned something: we expect
there to be a computable function which, given f , ωf , M and ǫ, computes
a δ such that approxQ(f, ǫ, δ). Actually, since we don’t use anything about
f other than ucont(f) and
∫
|f(x)|dx < M , we don’t expect the bound to
depend on f : in other words, we expect the modulus of uniqueness to depend
only on ωf and M . (In fact, as discussed in [33], more careful examination
of this statement shows that we can do a bit better: by replacing f by
f˜(x) = f(x)− f(0), we can eliminate the dependence of
∫
|f(x)|dx, so that
bounds depend only on the modulus of continuity.)
4.3. The Significance of Syntax. It is worth stating explicitly what the
previous subsection implied: if a theorem can be put into the Π2 form
∀x∃yφ(x, y), we expect there to be a computable function G so that G(x)
is always effectively compact and such that we can prove that ∀x∃y ∈
G(x)φ(x, y). Furthermore, as we will describe in the next subsection, we
expect to be able to take a proof of the original statement and systemat-
ically convert it into a particular choice of G and a proof of the bounded
statement.
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If a theorem cannot be put into the Π2 form then this might not happen.
It is possible that we can both prove ∀x∃y∀zφ(x, y, z) and also prove that
the value of x does not suffice to give a computable bound on the value of
y. Further, it may be very hard to determine whether this is the case.
If we want to think about which proofs have constructive bounds and
which don’t, we have to begin with the fact that there is a qualitative dif-
ference between Π2 statements and other statements.
4.4. Proof Extraction. So suppose we have a proof of a Π2 statement, as
in Jackson’s Theorem. We have said that we expect there to be a computable
bound, and we now turn to the question of extracting such a bound from a
proof of the original statement.
Let us begin by considering what we could do with completely formal
proofs—that is, proofs which consist of a sequence of formulas, and with
each step justified by some formal axiom or inference rule. (We won’t worry
too much about the exact rules allowed; any reasonable choice will do.) If
every formula in the proof were in the Π2 form then we would expect the
proof to directly provide an explicit algorithm: typically any Π2 axiom will
have an obvious computable bound, and standard inference rules all preserve
the property of having explicit computable bounds.
However many proofs of Π2 statements have intermediate steps which
are not Π2. Jackson’s theorem is an example: the statement of Lemma 2.8
is not Π2. (Of course, this statement requires substantial massaging for it
to even be meaningful to ask whether the statement is Π2, and showing
that a statement cannot, in any way, be rearranged into a Π2 form is much
harder than showing that it can be. But the germ of the idea is given
in our discussion before Lemma 3.4: the bounds are discontinuous.) Such
statements break the flow of explicit computations through our proof, and
must usually be replaced by Π2 statements if we want to recover explicit
bounds.
We’ll focus on Lemma 2.8, since it was in the process of quantifying that
lemma that we had to do the most work. We face some difficulty translating
the assumption that g has at most n zeros into our format. A first attempt
at a translation would look something like this:
∀g, h [(∃n∃x1, . . . , xn∀y [g(y) = 0→ ∃i ≤ n y = xi])→ rest(g, h)]
where rest(g, h) is a formalization of “if h is continuous and
∫
h sgn g dx 6= 0
then for some λ, ||g − λh||1 < ||g||1”. Standard manipulations on first-order
logic allow us to pull some of the quantifiers to the front:
∀g, h, n, x1, . . . , xn∃y [(g(y) = 0→ ∃i ≤ n y = xi)→ rest(g, h)] .
The x1, . . . , xn are real numbers which are part of the initial block of quanti-
fiers over uncountable domains, but y is also an arbitrary real number. We
need to reformulate this so that we only need to consider rational values of
y; we can’t simply restrict the quantifier to rationals, though, since it could
well be that the zero itself actually occurs at a real.
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We need to make the statement more quantitative; the trick is to start in
the right place. To say that y = xi is equivalent to saying that for every δ,
|y − xi| < δ and similarly for g(y) = 0. So we can rephrase this as:
∀g, h, n, x1, . . . , xn∃y [([∀ζ > 0 |g(y)| < ζ]→ ∃i ≤ n∀δ > 0 |y − xi| < δ)→ rest(g, h)] .
We can now pull the quantifiers over ζ and δ out to the front; we actually
get to choose which quantifier will be the outermost, and we should make
this choice with the goal of minimizing the alternatations of quantifiers, and
therefore the ultimate complexity of the statement:
∀g, h, n, x1, . . . , xn∃y∀ζ > 0∃δ > 0 [(|g(y)| < ζ → ∃i ≤ n |y − xi| < δ)→ rest(g, h)] .
In this statement, it makes no difference whether we allow y to range over
the real numbers or the rationals, so we choose the rationals to make this
a sentence of the allowed kind. (This is really a reflection of the fact that
we have chosen the correct atomic formulas—equality on reals is not com-
putable, and therefore should not be treated as an atomic formula.)
Since y now quantifies over an effectively compact domain (the rationals
in the interval [0, 1]), we can put it back inside the other quantifiers:
∀g, h, n, x1, . . . , xn∀ζ > 0∃δ > 0 [(∀y |g(y)| < ζ → ∃i ≤ n |y − xi| < δ)→ rest(g, h)] .
To complete the process of finding the form of Lemma 3.4, we expand
rest(g, h). Initially, we might have:
∀g, h, ωg, ωhn, x1, . . . , xn∀ζ > 0∀γ > 0
[
∃δ > 0¬ (∀y |g(y)| < ζ → ∃i ≤ n |y − xi| < δ)
∨ ¬ucont(g, ωg)
∨ ¬ucont(h, ωh)
∨ |
∫
h sgn g dx| < γ
∨ ∃λ||g − λh||1 < ||g||1.
As noted above, ¬ucont(f, ω) has the ∃yφ(y) form, so this is a Π2 formula.
The actual Lemma 3.4 stated above includes some ad hoc simplification—
replacing the particular witnesses x1, . . . , xn and δ with the measurable set
B =
⋃
i≤n(xi − δ, xi + δ), and replacing the continuity of g and h with
just an L1 bound on h. These all weaken the assumptions, and therefore
strengthen the overall theorem; they are discovered by observing what prop-
erties actually get used in the proof. (Note that while the proof of the
resulting statement goes through with the weakened assumptions—in par-
ticular, without the continuity of g—we actually used the continuity of g to
derive the equivalence of the modified statement with the original one.)
Most importantly, the syntactic manipulations have guided us into dis-
covering that we should replace counting zeros with a bound on those y
with |g(y)| < ζ. What the proof-theoretic methods tells us is that this is
guaranteed to be the right thing to look at: both that we will be able to
obtain computable bounds for this lemma by using such a restriction, and
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that the rest of our proof will ultimately match up with this choice. In par-
ticular, this is a local transformation: while proving a quantitative version
of Lemma 2.8, we don’t need to look at the quantitative part of the other
lemmas to know whether the proof will still work.
4.5. More Complicated Sentences. In the case of Jackson’s Theorem,
the statements of all our lemmas naturally unravel to Π2 sentences, even if
they didn’t start that way. In a more general proof (see below for references
to some examples), that might not happen. For instance, an intermediate
step of the proof might be to show a statement of the form
∀x∃y∀zφ(x, y, z)
(if all quantifiers in φ are over effectively compact domains then this is called
a Π3 formula) and use this to prove
∀u∃vψ(u, v).
The proof might proceed something like this:
Given u, calculate suitable values of x. Then there is a y
such that ∀zφ(x, y, z), and we can use this y to calculate a
value v such that ψ(u, v) holds.
However, since there might be no way to compute y from x, this might not
actually give us a computable algorithm.
The essential idea of the functional interpretation is to replace the non-
quantitative formula ∀x∃y∀zφ(x, y, z) with a new quantitative analog which
may be strictly weaker than the original version, but which is still sufficient
to carry out the proof. This is best illustrated by an example at the purely
syntactic level: we will replace
∀x ∈ X ∃y ∈ Y ∀z ∈ Zφ(x, y, z)
with
∀x ∈ X ∀Z ∈ ZY ∃y ∈ Yφ(x, y, Z(y)).
In other words, given x and a function Z, we can find a y which works, not
necessarily for every z, but at least for the particular value Z(y) returned
by the function. Ultimately we will need to restrict Z to be a computable
function, though Π3 statements are simple enough that it does not matter.
In fact, for statements this simple, the modified form is actually equivalent
to the original:
Lemma 4.2. ∀x∃y∀zφ(x, y, z) holds iff ∀x∀Z∃yφ(x, y, Z(y)) holds.
Proof. The left to right direction is obvious: if ∀x∃y∀zφ(x, y, z) then, given
x, we let y be the corresponding witness, and then ∀zφ(x, y, z) holds, so in
particular, φ(x, y, Z(y)).
For the other direction, we show the contrapositive. Suppose ∃x∀y∃z¬φ(x, y, z).
Take some value x such that ∀y∃z¬φ(x, y, z), and consider the function Z
which, given y, choose a value Z(y) such that ¬φ(x, y, Z(y)). Then x,Z
form a counterexample to ∀x∀Z∃yφ(x, y, Z(y)). 
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Notice that in the left to right direction, our argument was constructive,
in the sense that, given a value of y which worked on the left, we obtained
a value which worked on the right. The right to left direction, however, was
not constructive—it was a proof by contradiction. Knowing a particular
value of y satisfying the formula of right, or even knowing a general method
for finding, from each x and Z, a value of y is not enough to find the single
value of y which works on the left.
The statement
∀x∀Z∃yφ(x, y, Z(y))
is Π2, so we expect to be able to concretely calculate y from x and Z. More
surprising is that when we have a proof of a Π2 statement ∀u∃vψ(u, v) from
∀x∃y∀zφ(x, y, z), we also have a proof of ∀u∃vψ(u, v) from ∀x∀Z∃yφ(x, y, Z(y)),
and the bounds on v (as a function of u) depend only on the bounds on y as
a function of x and Z. In other words, the statement ∀x∀Z∃yφ(x, y, Z(y))
captures all the computable information present in the original statement.
To handle even more complicated sentences, with yet more alternations of
quantifiers, we need not only functions, but functionals—operations which
map functions to functions, and then operations which map functionals to
functionals, and so on. In order to keep ourselves to countable domains (and
also to meet our goal of working with quantitative data), in general we need
to restrict ourselves to computable functions. If the domains in the original
statement are all countable (and coded appropriately) then it makes sense to
talk about computable functions from a countable domain to another count-
able domain, and there are only countably many such functions. (The outer
quantifier over an uncountable domain becomes an oracle—we fix an object
from an uncountable domain, but then all further discussion is computable
relative to the use of that object fixed at the beginning.)
To each formula φ we will assign a new formula, φND which will always
have the form
∃y∀xφD(x, y),
where φD will only have quantifiers over effectively compact domains. The
intention is that we will have a systematic method for converting proofs of
φ into a particular choice of y together with a proof that ∀xφD(x, y) holds.
The definitions of φD and φ
ND are given by induction on the form of φ.
Remember that we are now restricting ourselves to computable functions,
so when we write XY in the following definition, we mean the domain of
computable functions from Y to X.
When φ is atomic, φD = φ. For the inductive case, suppose we already
have φD(x, y) and ψD(u, v) where x has type X, y has type Y, u has type
U, and v has type V. Then
(1) (φ∧ψ)D(x, u, y, v) is φD(x, y)∧ψD(u, v) and (φ∧ψ)
ND = ∃y, v∀x, u φD(x, y)∧
ψD(u, v),
(2) (¬φ)D(X, y) is ¬φD(X(y), y) and (¬φ)
ND is ∃X ∈ XY∀y¬φD(X(y), y),
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(3) (φ → ψ)D(X,V, y, u) is φD(X(y, u), y) → ψD(u, V (y)) and (φ →
ψ)ND is
∃X ∈ XY×U∃V ∈ VY∀y, u(φD(X(y, u), y) → ψD(u, V (y)),
(4) (∀z ∈ S φ)D(x, Y, z) is φD(x, Y (z), z) and (∀z ∈ S φ)
ND is ∃Y ∀x, zφD(x, Y (z), z).
Instead of defining cases for ∨ and ∃, we derive them using the de Morgan
laws: (∃zφ)ND is (¬∀z¬φ)ND and (φ ∨ ψ)ND is (¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ))ND.
It is generally useful to think of φND as saying “y is a demonstration
that φ is true” where a purely mechanical verification that a statement is
true would require checking that φD(x, y) holds for all possible values of x.
Then some of the inductive cases are easy to interpret: for instance, if y
demonstrates φ holds and v demonstrates that ψ holds then the pair v, y
demonstrates φ ∧ ψ.
A more interesting case is implication; what does it mean to have an
explicit demonstration for φ → ψ? It means we should have an algorithm
which converts demonstrations of φ into demonstrations of ψ. This is the
function V : given a y which demonstrates φ, V (y) is a demonstration of
ψ. The complication is that when y fails to be a demonstration of φ—there
exists some x with ¬φD(x, y)—we don’t want V (y) to be arbitrary. Instead
we want to have the property that not only can we determine V (y) from y,
but when u is a counter-example to V (y), we can find a counter-example
X(y, u) to y. Because it is the most important case, it is worth dwelling on
this point: the interpretation of → here requires that we have an algorithm
which converts any y into a value V (y), without needing to know whether y
actually works or not—the commitment is that if y works then V (y) works
as well, and furthermore that we know how to translate a counter-example
to V (y) into a counter-example to y itself. This imposes something like
a continuity requirement on V : if y is “almost right”, in the sense that
counter-examples are rare (for instance, the only counter-examples are very
large values of x) then V (y) should be “almost right” as well.
We would like to add the following clause which would cause effectively
compact domains to behave more like finite sets:
When S is a effectively compact domain, (∀z ∈ S φ)D(x, Y, z)
is ∃y ≤ Y φD(x, y, z) and (∀z ∈ S φ)
ND is ∃Y ∀x∀z ∈ S∃y ≤
Y φD(x, y, z).
This says, roughly, that when we quantify over a effectively compact domain,
we obtain a bound on all witnesses needed for all elements of that domain.
Making this idea work turns out to be a bit difficult—this is the subject of
the monotone [27] and bounded [14] functional interpretations. However for
most practical applications, the additional effort is justified.
There are two properties that are needed to make the ND translation
useful. The first is that if we have a proof of φ in a reasonable theory (for
instance, Peano arithmetic) then we have a particular value of y together
with a proof that ∀xφD(x, y) actually holds. To prove this, we could pin
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down a particular formal system of axioms and inference rules, and then
prove that the translation of each axiom is justified, and also that each
inference rule preserves being justified. It is essential that the proof itself is
completely explicit—given a formal proof φ, there is an explicit procedure
for converting it into a proof of φND together with the associated algorithm.
It is convenient that the algorithm is short: a single line in the original proof
generally translates to a fixed, small number of lines in the new proof (the
exact values, of course, depending on the particular formal system).
The second important property of the ND translation is that it does not
alter Π2 formulas:
Lemma 4.3. When φ is quantifier-free, (∀x∃yφ(x, y))ND is equivalent to
the existence of a computable function Y such that ∀xφ(x, Y (x)).
Proof. Since φ has no quantifiers, φND is actually the formula φ except that
∨ has been replaced by ¬(¬ · · ·∧¬ · · · ), which is equivalent by the de Morgan
law. Then simply plugging in the definitions above, (∀x∃yφ(x, y))ND is
equivalent to
∃Y ∀xφ(x, Y (x))
where Y is a computable functionl. 
This, of course, is exactly what we want: given a proof of ∀x∃yφ(x, y),
we translate it, step by step, to an explicit proof of (∀x∃yφ(x, y))ND, which
means we have an actual function Y such that ∀xφ(x, Y (x)). However the
intermediate steps of the proof have been changed to bring out explicit
information which may have been hidden.
If we used the monotone functional interpretation in place of the ND
translation described above, we would get a stronger result; essentially
Lemma 4.4. When φ only has quantifiers over effectively compact domains,
(∀x∃yφ(x, y))ND is equivalent to the existence of a computable function Y
such that ∀x∃y ≤ Y (x)φ(x, y).
Making precise what y ≤ Y (x) means when y comes from a domain of
complicated functions, however, is a bit tricky.
We’ve described this as a process applied to completely formal proofs.
This is not a very practical approach; real proofs, as written in journals, are
far from being strings of logical formulas. If we had to first translate those
proofs into formal strings of logical inferences, that alone would be a huge
process, and empirical experience suggests that the proof becomes several
times as long when reduced to a completely formal proof4. What makes the
functional interpretation useful for actual substantial proofs is that it can
be applied relatively directly to journal proofs.
4The ratio of length of the formalized proof to the informal one is known as the de
Bruijn factor, and a value of 4 seems to be common [51].
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The functional interpretation is a local transformation: it tells us how to
translate each individual statement. So we can translate particular statements—
say, the statements of individual lemmas—and then fill in the proofs by hand,
knowing that there is a proof (and one close to the original). If this proves
too difficult, we can simply break the proof in half at some convenient point,
translate the statement of the halfway point, and prove two shorter lemmas.
We need the functional interpretation to complete our goal that extraction
of bounds depends on the syntactic form of the conclusion. No matter what
the intermediate steps look like, we can use the ND translation to convert
every step of the proof into an argument with explicit quantitative bounds.
5. Some Applications of the Functional Interpretation
5.1. Fixed Point Theorems. One place where non-constructive proofs
occur naturally is metric spaces (often special kinds of metric spaces, like
Banach spaces or C∗-algebras), where compactness is a powerful, frequently
used tool. The functional interpretation has been used extensively to extract
quantitative information from such proofs [6–10,17,25,28,29,31,32,37–41].
We’ll consider just one family of examples, fixed point theorems, with an
eye towards the importance of the syntactic form of statements. A typical
fixed point theorem is Edelstein’s fixed point theorem [13]:
Theorem 5.1. Let (K,d) be a compact metric space and f : K → K be
contractive—for any x, y ∈ K, d(f(x), f(y)) < d(x, y). Then for any x, the
sequence given by x0 = x, xk+1 = f(xk) converges to a unique c such that
f(c) = c.
In general, the statement that a sequence converges is not Π2—it has the
form
∀ǫ∃m∀n(n ≥ m→ d(xn, xn+1) < ǫ).
For Edelstein’s theorem, contractivity lets us make the following observa-
tion: once we have d(xm, c) < ǫ/2, we also have d(xn, c) < ǫ/2 for all n ≥ m,
and in particular, d(xn, xn+1) < ǫ for n ≥ m. If we know what c is, we see
that any m with d(xm, c) < ǫ/2 is an m we are looking for. The statement
∀ǫ∃m d(xm, c) < ǫ
is Π2, so we can expect to find explicit bounds for this. While we can’t
expect to actually use c when finding bounds, the choice of c is unique, and
it has an explicit modulus of uniqueness. By methods similar to the ones in
the effective proof of Jackson’s theorem, Kohlenbach showed [28] that from
the modulus of uniqueness, one can construct a modulus of continuity—
that is, one can figure out how c varies as x0 varies. Putting these facts
together—the rate of convergence in the original statement depends on the
convergence of xm to c, where c is continuous in x0—is enough to find a
computable function N(ǫ) so that for each x, each ǫ, and each n ≥ N(ǫ),
d(xn, c) < ǫ [26]. The function N depends on the diameter of K (that is,
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supx,y∈K d(x, y)) and a modulus of contractivity of f—a function η(ǫ) such
that d(x, y) > ǫ implies d(f(x), f(y)) + η(ǫ) < d(x, y).
To see that these considerations are really necessary, one can consider the
Krasnoselski fixed point theorem:
Theorem 5.2 ( [35]). Let K be a convex, closed and bounded set in a
uniformly convex Banach space (X, || · ||), f a mapping of K into a compact
subset of K such that f is non-expansive—that is, ||f(x)− f(y)|| ≤ ||x− y||
for all x, y. Then for every x0 ∈ K, the sequence given by
xk+1 =
xk + f(xk)
2
converges to a p such that f(p) = p.
Again this is a convergence statement, so not in a Π2 form. Unlike Edel-
stein’s fixed point theorem, this is really unavoidable—Kohlenbach gives an
example [30] showing that there can be no algorithm finding bounds from x0
and f . However a similar idea is to observe that the quantity ||xn − f(xn)||
is decreasing, and therefore given ǫ one can hope to find an n such that
||xn − f(xn)|| ≤ ǫ. (This is a bound on the asymptotic regularity of the se-
quence (xn).) Asymptotic regularity is Π2, and it is therefore unsurprising
that many explicit bounds are known, both by analytic methods [23,34] and
by use of the functional interpretation [30].
5.2. Ultraproducts and Similar Constructions. Another common source
of non-constructive proofs is the compactness of first-order logic—that is,
nonstandard analysis, or, more generally, the use of ultraproducts5. We be-
gin with a sequence of models MN of a language L and combine them into
a single model M with the property that M  φ for a formula φ in L if and
only if for “most” N , MN  φ. If we prove that φ must hold in M, we can
conclude that it holds in MN for “most”, and certainly for infinitely many
N . (See [3] for discussion of the reverse argument, that ultraproducts can
be used to show the existence of uniform bounds.)
A typical example is the ergodic-theoretic proof of Szemerédi’s Theorem
[15,16]:
Theorem 5.3. For every ǫ > 0 and every k, there is an N such that if
A ⊆ [1, N ] with |A| ≥ ǫN then there are a, d with
{a, a+ d, a+ 2d, . . . , a+ (k − 1)d} ⊆ A.
Note that this is Π2—for every ǫ and k, there is an N ; the quantifiers over
A and over a, d are over finite sets.
5This general idea has been rediscovered a number of times, especially various special
cases that don’t depend as heavily on the general logical framework, and is therefore known
by a number of names: Banach limits, the Furstenberg correspondence, vague convergence,
and graphons. These are not all exactly the same notion, but when our concern is the
extraction of computable bounds, the differences are not significant.
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If the statement isn’t true, we may fix ǫ > 0 and k, and for each N find an
AN ⊆ [1, N ] with |AN | ≥ ǫN so that a contains no arithmetic progression
of length k. We take the language L containing a unary relation symbol
A, a unary function T , and for each formula φ(x) with only the displayed
free variables and each q ∈ Q>0, a 0-ary relation symbol mφ,q. We interpret
([1, 2N ], AN ) as a model of this language by taking AN as the interpretation
of A, x 7→ x+ 1 mod 2N as the interpretation of T , and
([1, N ], AN )  mφ,q ⇔ |{x | ([1, N ], An)  φ(x)}| ≥ 2qN.
(The last clause is technical; it gives us some ability to talk about the mea-
sure of sets using formulas in the language. This is a special case of more
general approaches for considering measures in the context of first-order
logic [4, 19,22].)
We then work in the ultraproduct of these models, which we call (X,A).
Observe that if we can prove, for some d, that the ultraproduct satisfies the
formula
∃xx ∈ A ∧ T dx ∈ A ∧ · · · ∧ T (k−1)dx ∈ A
then infinitely many of the finite models ([1, 2N ], AN ) satisfy this formula.
Take N much larger than d and let a ∈ [1, 2N ] witness this fact. Since
AN ⊆ [1, N ] and each T
ida ∈ AN , we must have T
ida = a + id for each
i < k. (We are going to a small amount of trouble here to prevent the case
where the progression involves “wrapping around”, since T is interpreted
as addition mod 2N .) Therefore a, a + d, . . . , a + (k − 1)d is an arithmetic
progression in AN . This gives the desired contradiction, since the AN were
chosen to be sets with no arithmetic progressions.
Furstenberg gives a proof [16] that the ultraproduct satisfies this formula
by way of interpreting the ultraproduct as dynamical system. (He phrases
his construction quite differently, but the essential idea is the same.)
If we want to give a constructive version of this proof, we face the following
obstacle. The ergodic theoretic argument involves statements about the
measure—say, µ(A ∩ TA) > 0. Translated into a formula, this is
∃q ∈ Q>0mAx∧A(Tx),q.
We need to distinguish between formulas in the precise, formally defined
language L and formulas in the informal sense we used them in the previous
sentence. This formula, with its quantifier over Q>0, is a formula in the
broader sense, but it isn’t actually a formula in L. In particular, we don’t
automatically have that (X,A) satisfies this formula exactly when most
([1, 2N ], AN ) satisfy this formula.
There is an obvious attempt at a solution: we could extend L to a bigger
language L′, with two sorts, where the second sort is intended to represent
Q>0. We would replace mφ,q with mφ(q), where q will obviously range over
the second sort. Then we start with two-sorted models ([1, 2N ], AN ,Q
>0).
The problem is that when we take the ultraproduct, we also have to take
the ultraproduct in the second sort, so we get a model (X,A, (Q>0)∗), where
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(Q>0)∗ is the (positive) nonstandard rational numbers—which includes in-
finitesimal rationals.
But the formula we want, ∃q ∈ Q>0mAx∧A(Tx)(q), is not the same as the
formula ∃q ∈ (Q>0)∗mAx∧A(Tx)(q); the latter allows for the posibility that
the measure of A ∩ TA is “positive” but infinitesimal.
The issue is that when we talk about the distinction between sets of
positive measure and sets of measure 0, we want to work with the non-
compact domain Q>0. In an ultraproduct, all the domains in the language
of the model are compact, so we can only discuss the distinction between
positive and 0 measure by including quantifiers outside the language of the
ultraproduct.
However the transfer principle tells us that we have the following corre-
spondence:
Lemma 5.4. Consider a statement in the form ∀x ∈ D∃y ∈ Sφ(x, y) where
D is arbitrary, S is countable, and φ is a statement in the language L. Then
M  ∀x∃yφ(x, y) iff for every x ∈ D there is a y ∈ S such that for most N ,
MN  φ(x, y).
In other words, we have a correspondence between Π2 sentences in M and
those in the MN , namely that Π2 statements which are uniformly true in
the finite models are true in the infinite one.
For statements which are not Π2, we do not have such a correspondence.
For example, the ergodic proof of Szemerédi’s Theorem uses the mean er-
godic theorem, the relevant case of which is the following statement:
Let αn(x) =
1
n
∑
i≤n χA(x+n) and let ||α(x)|| =
√
1
|X|
∑
x∈X α
2(x).
For every ǫ > 0, there is an n such that for all m ≥ n
||αn(x)− αm(x)|| < ǫ.
We may treat the inner part of the statement—||αn(x) − αm(x)|| < ǫ—as
being a formula in L (working this out in detail requires expanding the
language and getting into technicalities about representing the measure as
part of L). Even so, this isn’t Π2, since we have three quantifiers over
countable domains on the outside.
In fact, this statement is true in the finite models, for utterly trivial
reasons—in ([1, 2N ], AN ), take n to be much, much larger than N , so that
for any m ≥ n, αm(x) is the function which is very close to
1
N
∑
i≤N χA(i)
at every point. This is a vacuous argument, and it doesn’t reflect the real
mathematical content of the mean ergodic theorem. We can’t expect to
express the full content of saying that an infinite sequence converges in a
finite model.
The functional interpretation tells us that every statement implies a Π2
statement which captures its computational content. The right statement
here is
For every ǫ > 0 and every function F , there is an n such that
if F (n) ≥ n then ||αn − αF (n)|| < ǫ.
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This is also true in the finite models, with a bound on n that depends on ǫ
and F , but not on the size of the finite model. This is the statement about
finite models which matches up correctly with the mean ergodic theorem in
the ultraproduct.
We can make this statement slightly nicer with the following observation:
given a function F , define F ′ by
F ′(n) =
{
The least m ∈ [n,F (n)] such that ||αn − αm|| ≥ ǫ if there is one
F (n) otherwise
.
Then F ′ is computable from F , and by appling the statement above to F ′
instead of F , we obtain
For every ǫ > 0 and every function F , there is an n such that
if F (n) ≥ n then for all m ∈ [n,F (n)], ||αn − αm|| < ǫ.
The usual mean ergodic theorem tells us that the averages αn stabilize.
This version tells us that we can find arbitrarily long intervals on which the
average remains stable. This is known as the metastability of the average
[2, 44,50].
A recent generalization of this idea is in [46], where the corresponding
notion of metastability for a double limit is used to give an effective version
of a theorem about L1 functions; this is applied in [45] to give explicit bounds
for a theorem about Banach spaces—the “failure of local unconditionality
of the James space”—whose usual proof involves an ultraproduct.
Note that in this case it’s incidental that what the functional interpre-
tations extracts from proofs which used ultraproducts is computable—the
same method would work with any language and any replacement for our
finite models. What’s really important is that the functional interpretation
tells us how to correspond statements about the ultraproduct model to state-
ments in the original models. In almost every situation where we care about
this, it makes sense to view us as extracting information computable from
the original models, but there has been some recent investigation of this
idea more abstractly, where one has the right syntactic features to extract
information using the functional interpretation, but where one need not be
working with computable information [20,47,48]
6. Further Reading
There are two well-established and complementary introductions to the
functional interpretation. Avigad and Feferman [1] give a thorough intro-
duction to the formal theory of the functional interpretation in the most
important settings, including a number of variants and many applications
within proof theory. Kohlenbach [24] gives a detailed guide to the applica-
tions of the functional interpretation outside logic, especially in analysis.
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